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OFFICER DISCRETION AND THE CHOICE TO 
RECORD: OFFICER ATTITUDES TOWARDS 
BODY-WORN CAMERA ACTIVATION* 
BRYCE CLAYTON NEWELL** & RUBEN GREIDANUS*** 
In recent years, questions about when police officers should 
activate (or not activate) their body-worn cameras during police-
public encounters have risen into the foreground of public and 
scholarly debate. Understanding how officers perceive body-
worn cameras and policies surrounding activation (and how they 
view these as impacting their ability to make discretionary 
choices while on the job) can provide greater insight into why, 
when, and how officers may attempt to exercise their discretion in 
the form of resistance or avoidance to body cameras, seen as 
technologies of accountability. In this Article, we examine officer 
attitudes about how much discretion they ought to have about 
when (or when not) to activate their cameras, what concerns they 
have about overbroad, overly punitive, or ambiguous activation 
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policies, and their perceptions about how frequently cameras 
ought to be activated in specific circumstances (i.e., general 
police-public interactions, arrest situations, domestic violence 
calls, traffic stops, when taking statements from witnesses or 
victims, and when responding to calls inside homes and medical 
facilities). These findings are drawn from a multi-year and 
mixed-methods study of police officer adoption of body-worn 
cameras in two municipal police departments in the Pacific 
Northwest region of the United States from 2014 to 2018. 
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In the past few years, questions about when police officers 
should activate (or not activate) their body-worn cameras (“BWCs”) 
when contacting or otherwise interacting with a member of the public 
have risen into the foreground of public and scholarly debate. 
Instances in which camera-wearing officers have failed to activate 
their cameras have also received significant media scrutiny.1 
                                                 
1. See, e.g., Jared Goyette, Australian Justine Damond Shot Dead by US Police in 
Minneapolis, THE GUARDIAN (July 16, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/jul/17/australian-woman-justine-damond-shot-dead-by-us-police-in-minneapolis 
[https://perma.cc/5XRS-79BG]; Eric Levenson, Minneapolis Police Shooting Exposes 
Flaws of Body Cameras, CNN (July 19, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/19/us
/minneapolis-police-shooting-body-camera/index.html [https://perma.cc/F5UK-NPZV]; 
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Departmental policies in police agencies around the country (and 
beyond) that ostensibly regulate officer behavior in this context are 
varied,2 although emerging evidence suggests (predictably) that 
agency-level activation policies can impact officer activation rates in 
some circumstances (as can other factors, such as the presence of 
other officers and bystanders or whether camera use is mandated or 
voluntary).3 Concerns that civil society groups, the press, and 
members of the public have regarding activation policies and 
activation practices are often linked to normative ideas about police 
accountability and transparency, the appropriateness and limits of 
officer discretion, and, in some cases, the adverse impact that 
increased recording may have on privacy interests.4  
                                                                                                                 
Editorial, Officers, Turn on Your Body Cameras, WASH. POST (July 22, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/officers-turn-on-your-body-cameras/2017/07/22
/41290ff0-6e3e-11e7-b9e2-2056e768a7e5_story.html?utm_term=.67385a2d0d90 [https://perma.cc
/MW4F-ZA54]; Brandt Williams, Minneapolis Officers Failed to Turn on Body Cameras 
Before Fatal Shooting, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 18, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/07/18
/537861230/minneapolis-officers-failed-to-turn-on-body-cameras-before-fatal-shooting 
[https://perma.cc/L36T-FQ2L]. 
 2. See Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, and Police Body Cameras: The 
National Policy Split, 68 ALA. L. REV. 395, 422–23 (2016); POLICE BODY WORN 
CAMERAS: A POLICY SCORECARD, THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE & UPTURN (2017), 
https://www.bwcscorecard.org/static/pdfs/LCCHR%20and%20Upturn%20-%20BWC
%20Scorecard%20v.3.04.pdf [https://perma.cc/KL5T-H4W8]. 
 3. See, e.g., Jacob T.N. Young & Justin T. Ready, A Longitudinal Analysis of the 
Relationship Between Administrative Policy, Technological Preferences, and Body-Worn 
Camera Activation Among Police Officers, 12 POLICING: J. POL’Y & PRACTICE 27, 36–39 
(2018) (finding that camera activation rates declined under a discretionary use policy, 
especially by officers who had not volunteered to wear the cameras; but also finding that 
camera activation rates decreased when victims were present); Allyson Roy, On-Officer 
Video Cameras: Examining the Effects of Police Department Policy and Assignment on 
Camera Use and Activation 33–34 (May 2014) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Arizona State 
University) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (finding that department policy; 
the presence of bystanders, witnesses, or supervisors; and voluntary versus mandatory use 
affected camera activation rates). 
 4. See Fan, supra note 2, at 422–23; Alexandra Mateescu, Alex Rosenblat & danah 
boyd, Dreams of Accountability, Guaranteed Surveillance: The Promises and Costs of 
Body-Worn Cameras, 14 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 122, 122 (2016) (noting that “balancing 
the right of public access with the need to protect against this technology’s invasive 
aspects” is important because “body-worn cameras present definite and identifiable risks 
to privacy”); Bryce Clayton Newell, Collateral Visibility: A Socio-Legal Study of Police 
Body-Camera Adoption, Privacy, and Public Disclosure in Washington State, 92 IND. L.J. 
1329, 1341 (2017) (discussing how public disclosure of body-worn camera video under 
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In the end, questions about appropriate activation policies and 
practices are all about power, accountability, and information politics. 
They cannot always be easily separated from related questions about 
information access and control, meaning that the appropriateness of 
any particular activation policy may depend in large part on the local 
social, political, and legal context in which the cameras are being 
deployed. 
These issues are hotly contested and often difficult to research. 
However, the implications of these policy decisions may have 
significant impacts on how BWCs are used by officers and what (and 
how much) visual evidence is collected, as well as on other aspects of 
officer behavior, such as on the frequency of officers engaging in uses 
of force5 or stop-and-frisks.6 Research suggests that strict 
(mandatory) activation policies may increase activation rates,7 while 
some studies have also found that compliance with activation policies 
has declined over time in certain police agencies.8 A growing body of 
literature also examines officer attitudes towards BWCs, and multiple 
studies engage Orlikowski and Gash’s concept of “technological 
frames”9 to understand how officers’ perceptions and interpretations 
                                                                                                                 
state access to information laws may negatively impact the privacy interests of members of 
the public). 
 5. Barak Ariel et al., Report: Increases in Police Use of Force in the Presence of 
Body-Worn Cameras Are Driven by Officer Discretion: A Protocol-Based Subgroup 
Analysis of Ten Randomized Experiments, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 453, 459 
(2016). 
 6. Justin T. Ready & Jacob T.N. Young, The Impact of On-Officer Video Cameras 
on Police–Citizen Contacts: Findings From a Controlled Experiment in Mesa, AZ, 11 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 445, 445 (2015). 
 7. Roy, supra note 3, at 33, 40. 
 8. CHARLES M. KATZ ET AL., ARIZ. STATE UNIV. CTR. FOR VIOLENCE 
PREVENTION & CMTY. SAFETY, EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF OFFICER WORN BODY 
CAMERAS IN THE PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT 7, 21 (2014) 
https://publicservice.asu.edu/sites/default/files/ppd_spi_feb_20_2015_final.pdf [https://perma.cc
/777Y-GWYG]. 
 9. Wanda J. Orlikowski & Debra C. Gash, Technological Frames: Making Sense of 
Information Technology in Organizations, 12 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. SYS. 174, 
178 (1994) (“We use the term technological frame to identify that subset of members’ 
organizational frames that concern the assumptions, expectations, and knowledge they use 
to understand technology in organizations. This includes not only the nature and role of 
the technology itself, but the specific conditions, applications, and consequences of that 
technology in particular contexts.”). 
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of the technology may impact how they use it.10 The concept of 
technological frames aims to capture how individuals or groups 
perceive and understand a technology, including the assumptions they 
have about how the technology functions, how useful the technology 
might be, and what sort of concerns they might have about learning to 
use it.11 In the context of BWC deployment, these frames of reference 
should be seen as changing over time, as officers’ experiences with 
cameras evolve, and not as fixed at a single point of reference (for 
example, at the moment of adoption).12 Thus, understanding how 
officers perceive BWCs and policies surrounding activation (and how 
these perceptions may change over time), how they view the cameras 
as impacting their ability to make discretionary choices while on the 
job, and the reasons they have concerns about the use of BWCs, can 
provide greater insight into why, when, and how officers may attempt 
to exercise their discretion in the form of resistance or avoidance.13 
This Article examines officer attitudes regarding the amount of 
discretion they think they ought to have in deciding when (or when 
not) to activate their cameras, as well as their perceptions about how 
frequently cameras ought to be activated in specific circumstances. 
These findings are drawn from a multi-year and mixed-methods study 
of police officer adoption of BWCs in two municipal police 
departments in the Pacific Northwest region of the United States 
from September 2014 to January 2018. The research draws on 
responses from sworn police officers in these departments during 
ride-alongs (informal interviews) and to both qualitative and 
quantitative responses to questions on a series of questionnaires.  
                                                 
 10. Marthinus Christoffel Koen, On-Set with Body-Worn Cameras in a Police 
Organization: Structures, Practices, and Technological Frames 5–8 (2016) (unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, George Mason Univ.) (on file at George Mason Univ.); Roy, supra note 3, at 
12–13. 
 11. See Orlikowski & Gash, supra note 9, at 178–79. 
 12. Roy, supra note 3, at 13 (describing how officers’ initial reluctance to new 
technology may change with time). 
 13. For a discussion of various forms of resistance, avoidance, and neutralization, see 
Gary T. Marx, A Tack in the Shoe: Neutralizing and Resisting the New Surveillance, 59 J. 
SOC. ISSUES 369, 372–84 (2003); Gary T. Marx, A Tack in the Shoe and Taking Off the 
Shoe: Neutralization and Counter-neutralization Dynamics, 6 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 
294, 294–97 (2009). 
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In addition, this Article seeks to answer the following research 
questions (at least insofar as they pertain to the two agencies included 
in our study): What discretion do officers feel they should have 
regarding when their BWCs should (or should not) be activated? 
How frequently do officers feel that BWCs should generally be 
activated in various contexts (i.e., in all police-citizen interactions, 
arrest situations, traffic stops, inside homes, inside medical facilities, 
during domestic violence calls for service, or while taking witness or 
victim statements)? How frequently do officers who have used 
cameras report activating their cameras in each of these same 
situations?  
Of course, the policy options available here are not merely 
binary: there may be contexts where recording should be mandated or 
prohibited but, in many cases, it may also be appropriate to permit 
the officers to record in circumstances where recording is not 
mandatory or to make the choice not to record in circumstances 
where recording has not been prohibited.14 Importantly, officers have 
long been making these sorts of (discretionary) decisions (e.g., to 
document something they observe or hear) in many aspects of their 
work. The sophisticated understanding that many officers have of the 
law that regulates their ability to stop, search, or use force (at least on 
a practical level) has yet to be replicated with regard to the 
appropriateness and proportionality of recording across a variety of 
police-public interactions. Several scholars have made normative 
arguments about what legal consequences should follow a failure to 
record, particularly when the failure to record was in violation of 
mandatory activation policies.15 
Our reliance on primarily self-reported attitudinal data in this 
study means, of course, that many of our findings are not conclusions 
about what happened (e.g., actual compliance rates) within each of 
                                                 
 14. See Seth W. Stoughton, Police Body-Worn Cameras, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1363, 1416 
(2018) (“An agency policy that sets out clear standards for mandatory, permitted, and 
prohibited recording is a necessary component of a robust body-worn camera policy.”). 
 15. See, e.g., David A. Harris, Picture This: Body-Worn Video Devices (Head Cams) 
as Tools for Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance by Police, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 
357, 365 (2010) (arguing for a “presumption that the defendant’s version of events should 
be accepted, absent (1) a compelling reason explaining the failure to record, and (2) a 
finding that the defendant’s version of events could not be believed by a reasonable 
person”). 
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these departments, but rather are reflections on how officers 
conceptualize, internalize, and frame their use of the cameras—at 
least insofar as they are willing to disclose this to third-party 
researchers. Collecting and analyzing attitudinal data over time is 
useful in this context, because, along with the qualitative insights 
gleamed during ride-alongs, it allows us to better understand the 
technological frames that officers have of the cameras (and how these 
may change over time), how organizational considerations shape 
technology use by officers, and ways in which officers might wish to 
resist compliance or use the technology in unexpected ways.16 
Manning has argued that “[s]ignificant differences in response to 
and use of .	.	. technology [by police officers] are .	.	. best understood 
as consistent with the impressions members of the organization wish 
to convey to particular audiences.”17 If this is the case, it suggests that 
the information politics of the police have been impacted by the 
deployment of BWCs within these agencies. Because transparency 
and accountability (including access to BWC video) have become 
dominant themes surrounding the adoption of cameras across the 
United States, the potential visibility that camera activation implies 
for individual officers may impact how often, and when, cameras are 
activated—by regulating officers’ individual choices about whether to 
record, in accordance or not with departmental policy, or by 
influencing the development of departmental policy itself.  
The Article proceeds as follows: First, we discuss relevant 
existing scholarship from both the legal and criminological literature 
and provide additional background and context for our study. Second, 
we describe our research methods and outline the demographic 
characteristics of our respondents and the agencies in which they 
work. Third, we present both qualitative and quantitative findings 
relevant to the research questions presented above. Finally, we 
conclude the paper by drawing connections between our findings and 
the existing literature, discussing implications of various policy 
choices on privacy, officer resistance, and evidentiary presumptions, 
and present the argument that activation policies need to be drafted 
                                                 
 16. See Peter K. Manning, Information Technology in the Police Context: The “Sailor” 
Phone, 7 INFO. SYS. RES. 52, 52 (1996). 
 17. Id. 
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to provide officers clear and practical guidance and to incentivize 
activation in appropriate circumstances while allowing for some forms 
of discretion, particularly in situations that implicate the legitimate 
privacy-related concerns of bystanders, victims, witnesses, informants, 
and suspects. Importantly, we note that questions of public access to 
footage may also need to be addressed to properly incentivize 
recording in some circumstances where the potential for wide public 
visibility may push against officers’ willingness to record due to 
privacy (or other) concerns. 
I.  BACKGROUND  
Camera activation policies and the degree of officer discretion 
afforded to individual officers are key to realizing some envisioned 
benefits of BWCs. Recent studies have found contradictory results 
about whether BWC implementation leads to reduced levels of use of 
force and complaints against officers within an agency, but the 
evidence suggests that officer discretion may be a key variable. In the 
first randomized controlled trial of BWCs in the United States, 
researchers reported that the cameras had a significant impact on the 
frequency with which officers used force as well as the number of 
citizen complaints against officers.18 However, in a subsequent 
replication study across multiple police departments, the researchers 
found that, on average across sites, camera adoption had no 
significant effect on use of force rates.19 Interestingly, though, the 
results of the multi-site study showed that officers who complied with 
the experimental conditions by not exercising discretion and always 
activating their cameras engaged in less use of force than officers in 
                                                 
 18. Barak Ariel, William Farrar & Alex Sutherland, The Effect of Police Body-Worn 
Cameras on Use of Force and Citizens’ Complaints Against the Police: A Randomized 
Controlled Trial, 31 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 509, 523–24 (2015). 
 19. Barak Ariel et al., Wearing Body Cameras Increases Assaults Against Officers and 
Does Not Reduce Police Use of Force: Results from a Global Multi-Site Experiment, 13 
EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 744, 745 (2016); Ariel et al., supra note 5, at 459–60 (2016). Other 
randomized controlled trial-based studies have also found that cameras have little or no 
statistically significant effect on use of force rates. See David Yokum, Anita Ravishankar 
& Alexander Coppock, Evaluating the Effects of Police Body-Worn Cameras: A 
Randomized Controlled Trial 11 (Lab @ D.C., Working Paper, Oct. 20, 2017) 
http://bwc.thelab.dc.gov/TheLabDC_MPD_BWC_Working_Paper_10.20.17.pdf [https://perma.cc
/T99F-45S4]. 
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the control group, while those who exercised discretion engaged in 
use of force much more frequently.20   
Drawing from deterrence theory, the authors proposed the 
“deterrence spectrum,” ranging from weak deterrence (lax activation 
policies, lack of consequences for violations) to strong deterrence 
(mandatory activation policies, high likelihood of consequences).21 
Accordingly, they concluded that, “[t]he deterrence spectrum is 
closely linked to activation policies, and specifically to discretion: the 
more officers can opt-out from mandatory activation procedures (and 
without consequences for deactivations), the less we should expect 
the BWCs to effect policing.”22 These findings led the researchers to 
conclude that “cameras should remain on throughout the entire 
shift—that is, during each and every interaction with citizens—and 
should be prefaced by a verbal reminder that the camera is present.”23 
This suggestion also tracks a recommendation by the American Civil 
Liberties Union (“ACLU”) that officers should activate cameras 
prior to any interaction with the public.24 While the ACLU 
recommendation allows for some minor discretion, it simultaneously 
emphasizes that activation policies which allow for officer discretion 
can only be effective if (enforceable) consequences exist for failure to 
adhere to the departments’ activation policies.25  
One technological fix in this situation could be automated 
activation in various circumstances,26 something that many body-
camera manufacturers have already been developing and 
incorporating into their technologies.27 This technical solution could 
                                                 
 20. Ariel et al., supra note 5, at 459. 
 21. Barak Ariel et al., The Deterrence Spectrum: Explaining Why Police Body-Worn 
Cameras ‘Work’ or ‘Backfire’ in Aggressive Police–Public Encounters, 12 POLICING: J. 
POL’Y & PRACTICE 6, 14–16 (2018). 
 22. Id. at 22. 
 23. Ariel et al., supra note 5, at 461. 
 24. JAY STANLEY, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, POLICE BODY-MOUNTED 
CAMERAS: WITH RIGHT POLICIES IN PLACE, A WIN FOR ALL (VERSION 2.0) 4–5 (2015), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/police_body-mounted_cameras-v2.pdf [https://perma.cc
/77Q5-X6PJ]. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Ariel et al., supra note 21, at 20–21. 
 27. Activation could be triggered by, amongst other things, holster activity, opening 
the car door, or activating the police sirens. See, e.g., Sebastian Anthony, New Holster 
Forces All Nearby Body Cams to Start Recording When Gun is Pulled, ARS TECHNICA, 
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simultaneously provide less discretion regarding when to record while 
also freeing the officer to deal with the situation at hand, and it would 
also lessen the possibility that activation during an already tense 
interaction may be seen “as a confrontational reaction made by the 
officer,” thus escalating the tension in the situation and making it 
more likely that force may be used (or necessary).28 
A report from the U.S. Department of Justice, based on its 
investigation of the Albuquerque (New Mexico) Police Department, 
described several incidents where officers failed to activate their 
BWCs in use of force contexts.29 In some of these incidents, the 
officers initiated the contact, making the failure to activate “especially 
troubling.”30 The report notes “repetitive or standardized 
explanations for failing to record,” such as “the immediacy of the 
situation,” despite officers having sufficient opportunity to activate 
the camera.31 In the end, only a small number of officers were 
disciplined for their failure to comply.32 Additionally, Denver’s Office 
of the Independent Monitor found that fewer than half of the use of 
force incidents (that occurred in one of the Denver Police 
Department’s patrol districts during the department’s pilot project) 
with a BWC present were actually recorded by the officers wearing 
the cameras.33  
A more fundamental issue concerns the fact that some 
departments simply do not have any written policy at all.34 As such, it 
                                                                                                                 
(Feb. 28, 2017 8:46 AM), https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2017/02/axon-signal-sidearm-
automatic-body-cam [https://perma.cc/GP9H-TN2X]. 
 28. Ariel et al., supra note 21, at 20. 
 29. Letter from Jocelyn Samuels, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., 
& Damon P. Martinez, Acting U.S. Attorney, Dist. of N.M., to Richard J. Berry, Mayor, 
City of Albuquerque, N.M. 25–26 (Apr. 10, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default
/files/crt/legacy/2014/04/10/apd_findings_4-10-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MT6-EWVJ]. 
 30. Id. at 26. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. NICHOLAS E. MITCHELL, DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, 2014 
ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2015) https://www.denvergov.org/content/dam/denvergov/Portals
/374/documents/2014_Annual_Report%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/PX5Y-4VHL] 
(“[J]ust less than half (47%) of those use of force incidents were actually captured by 
BWCs. The remainder were not recorded either because the BWCs weren’t activated, or 
they weren’t used in a way that produced useable and complete footage.”). 
 34. See POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN 
CAMERA PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 2 (2014), 
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is no surprise that the ACLU emphasizes the need for clear policies 
that also “have some teeth.”35 Aside from the possibility of direct 
disciplinary action against individual officers, the ACLU goes several 
steps further and proposes the “adoption of rebuttable evidentiary 
presumptions in favor of criminal defendants who claim exculpatory 
evidence was not captured or was destroyed” and even evidentiary 
presumptions on behalf of civil plaintiffs suing for damages.36 
Although courts have traditionally applied such evidentiary 
presumptions in cases where evidence was destroyed,37 it is possible 
that courts may also apply evidentiary presumptions in cases where 
footage is absent altogether.38 
The position that cameras should always be on or that all 
encounters should be recorded has garnered criticism.39 Arguments 
against such policy include negative impact on community 
relationships and the fact that it signifies a lack of trust in local 
officers.40 As the President of the Association of Chief Police Officers 
in the United Kingdom puts it, “[l]egitimacy in policing is built on 
trust. And the notion of video-recording every interaction in a very 
tense situation would simply not be a practical operational way of 
delivering policing. In fact, it would exacerbate all sorts of 
problems.”41 Practically speaking, always-on on policies also lead to a 
massive amount of video footage that must be processed and stored. 
Privacy concerns are also frequently cited as a strong argument 
against always-on policies and in favor of officer discretion. Privacy 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Technology/implementing
%20a%20body-worn%20camera%20program.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KT6-8F8H]; Kelly 
Freund, Note, When Cameras Are Rolling: Privacy Implications of Body-Mounted 
Cameras on Police, 49 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 91, 109 (2015).  
 35. STANLEY, supra note 24, at 4–5. 
 36. Id.; see also, Harris, supra note 15, at 365 (proposing a presumption in favor of the 
claimant’s testimony of officer misconduct when an officer fails to record). 
 37. See, e.g., Wong v. Swier, 267 F.2d 749, 759 (9th Cir. 1959) (stating that “when 
there is tampering with evidence, a presumption against the parties who are responsible 
arises.”). 
 38. MARC JONATHAN BLITZ, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY, 
POLICE BODY-WORN CAMERAS: EVIDENTIARY BENEFITS AND PRIVACY THREATS 11–
12 (2015) https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Blitz_-_On-Body_Cameras_-_Issue
_Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/SCZ3-PCJ9]. 
 39. See, e.g., Freund, supra note 34, at 119. 
 40. See, e.g., POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 34, at 13–14. 
 41. Id. at 14. 
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interests might be raised by a witness, victim, or suspect—for 
example, through an affirmative request that the officer cease 
recording—but they may also be raised by the recording officer, 
based on concerns that recording a certain conversation or interaction 
might violate the privacy of the officer or of those with whom the 
officer is interacting, especially when public records laws provide for 
liberal public disclosure of such video without clear privacy-related 
exemptions.42 
Aside from privacy issues arising from police presence in private 
spaces, it has also been suggested that BWCs may implicate Fourth 
Amendment rights.43 According to Blitz, however, this is unlikely 
because BWCs are unlikely to generate footage that allows for a 
comprehensive picture of someone’s life (at least without a massive 
effort by government), and are, instead, predominantly used as a tool 
to monitor officers.44 Nielsen comes to the same conclusion, and 
draws a parallel between BWCs and the prevailing view concerning 
pole cameras, which are thought to be incapable of recording 
anything covered under the reasonable expectation of privacy 
doctrine under regular conditions.45 Although the fate of the mosaic 
theory of the Fourth Amendment is still undecided,46 the 
incorporation of newer or more advanced capabilities, such as facial 
recognition, artificial intelligence, or increased field-of-view/zooming 
abilities into BWC systems would seem to make this sort of analysis 
more relevant in the body-camera context.47 Where the use of 
                                                 
 42. See Newell, supra note 4, at 1384–85 (noting in response to BWCs, officers have 
expressed “[p]rivacy concerns in connection to liberal public disclosure rules”). 
 43. See BLITZ, supra note 38, at 13 (discussing BWCs and the Fourth Amendment 
and observing “[s]ome critics of body-worn cameras have warned that by routinely 
recording the activities of citizens that unfold in front of a police officer, government 
would be engaging in a Fourth Amendment Search”). 
 44. Id. at 16. 
 45. Erik Nielsen, Comment, Fourth Amendment Implications of Police-Worn Body 
Cameras, 48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 115, 129–34 (2016). 
 46. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 400, 405–06 (2012). For a detailed 
overview and discussion of the mosaic theory after Jones, see Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic 
Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 313–14 (2012) (explaining that 
“[u]nder the mosaic theory, searches can be analyzed as a collective sequence of steps 
rather than as individual steps”). 
 47. See Nielsen, supra note 45, at 132–33 (concluding that increased technological 
capabilities of cameras could lead to Fourth Amendment violations). 
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wearable police cameras (both in public and in private spaces) may 
begin to implicate Fourth Amendment concerns—or even state 
wiretapping and eavesdropping concerns—remains somewhat 
unclear.48 
The literature recognizes that there are other ways of mitigating 
privacy concerns aside from granting officers’ discretion to turn their 
cameras on or off. For instance, Lin argues that even though “giving 
police officers broad discretion on when to record would allow 
officers to take privacy and sensitivity concerns into consideration,” 
such discretion may also lead to selective recording.49 Instead, he 
explores the possibility of data management techniques and data 
retention policies as a solution to the privacy problem (which takes 
place after the recording rather than prior to it).50 Blitz also 
recognizes this possibility, but warns that ex-post strategies may not 
be enough to “ease the fears of a witness unwilling to talk with a 
camera running.”51 In this regard, privacy is not only an abstract 
citizen interest, but may also affect how well officers are able to do 
their jobs. Moreover, if cameras are left running nigh-permanently 
and departments instead rely exclusively on ex-post strategies, then 
officer privacy may also be unduly implicated.52 And, as we discuss 
later, in states with liberal access to information policies, the fact that 
a video record exists, even if only briefly, may make it subject to 
public disclosure, exacerbating the privacy-related concerns of 
civilians.53 
Although it is evident that policy influences officer behavior 
concerning camera activation to some degree or another, policy does 
not guarantee it. Indeed, it is commonly accepted that merely 
introducing a certain technology to police by no means guarantees the 
envisioned effect. Historically speaking, outcomes of introducing new 
                                                 
 48. Freund, supra note 34, at 132 (“It is clear	.	.	. that the legal limits of how cameras 
can be used have not been completely established”). 
 49. Richard Lin, Police Body Worn Cameras and Privacy: Retaining Benefits While 
Reducing Public Concerns, 14 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 346, 359 (2016). 
 50. Id. at 360–61. 
 51. BLITZ, supra note 38, at 17. 
 52. See Freund, supra note 34, at 106–08, 120 (discussing privacy and safety concerns 
of police officers and citing the possibility of retaliation by superiors). 
 53. See Fan, supra note 2, at 411–12; Mateescu et al., supra note 4, at 122; Newell, 
supra note 4, at 1331, 1334, 1337. 
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technologies in law enforcement have been divergent across different 
police departments and different types of technologies, suggesting 
that “many organizational, technological and external factors” are at 
play.54 In understanding those divergent outcomes, Orlikowski and 
Gash introduced the concept of technological and organizational 
frames, which they define as a “subset of members’ organizational 
frames that concern the assumptions, expectations, and knowledge 
[that members of an organization] use to understand technology in 
organizations.”55 These frames, which are not static but rather, 
despite often being well entrenched, are capable of shifting,56 
consequently shape officer perceptions of new technologies. 
Therefore, altering these frames when needed can be crucial to 
reaching desired outcomes. When frames between groups are 
incongruent, then this “can result in conflicts about the development, 
use, and meaning of technologies in a police organization, as well as 
different outcomes of technology.”57 
In this regard, the idea of a single, uniform “police culture” has 
been contested, and it has instead been suggested that a multitude of 
police cultures exist, both between different departments and 
between different ranks of officers.58 Specifically, “street culture” 
(which is often characterized as being concerned with “uncertainty, 
solidarity, on-the-job experience, and distrust of superior officers”)59 
                                                 
 54. Koen, supra note 10, at 26. 
 55. Orlikowski & Gash, supra note 9, at 178. 
 56. See Wanda J. Orlikowski & Debra C. Gash, Changing Frames: Understanding 
Technological Change in Organizations 4 (Mass. Inst. of Tech., Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., 
Working Paper No. 3368-92 1992), http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/46992
/changingframesun00orli.pdf [https://perma.cc/K337-FHBR] (stating frames are “expected 
to vary by context and over time”). 
 57. Cynthia Lum, Christopher S. Koper & James Willis, Understanding the Limits of 
Technology’s Impact on Police Effectiveness, 20 POLICE Q. 135, 138 (2017). 
 58. See Eugene A. Paoline III, Taking Stock: Toward a Richer Understanding of 
Police Culture, 31 J. CRIM. JUST. 199, 207–09 (2003) (“In sum, the most recent 
developments in the study of police culture point out the changes in the demographics of 
occupational members and police philosophies over the past twenty-five years that may 
have eroded the monolithic police culture, to the extent that one ever existed.”); Carrie B. 
Sanders, Crystal Weston & Nicole Schott, Police Innovations, ‘Secret Squirrels’ and 
Accountability: Empirically Studying Intelligence-Led Policing in Canada, 55 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 711, 724 (2015) (concluding “workgroups” influence culture and rejecting 
“the notion of a monolithic universal police culture”). 
 59. Koen, supra note 10, at 138. 
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plays a key role in the grander scheme of police culture, as it is here 
that new officers are introduced to the job and “develop their style of 
policing.”60 With BWCs being primarily employed at the patrol level, 
the importance of proper implementation becomes especially 
apparent as positive experiences with the technology may allow room 
for officers to develop different styles of policing (in contrast to the 
traditional, reactive style of policing). It is possible that BWCs, when 
perceived as a symbol of distrust and tool of surveillance to be used 
against officers, would reinforce feelings of uncertainty and distrust of 
superior officers, ultimately discouraging more proactive policing. 
After all, for new officers, adhering to the traditional style will tend to 
entail less risk than proactive policing, which requires taking initiative 
and treading beyond the boundaries of basic protocol and established 
tradition. This would not only affect officers directly in their current 
capacity as patrol officers but may also have long lasting 
consequences for the entire organization as they move up (or, at least, 
to different positions) within the organization. 
Building on the concepts introduced by Orlikowski and Gash, 
Lum et al. found that “police view technology through technological 
and organizational frames determined by traditional and reactive 
policing approaches.”61 These traditional and reactive policing 
approaches “dominate law enforcement practice” and create “strong 
organizational and technological frames, which powerfully mediate 
the effects of technology on discretion, efficiency and effectiveness.”62 
Officers place great value on technological efficiency, and new 
technologies that are considered inefficient “or do not contribute to 
what officers believe to be their primary tasks,” tend to be met with 
resistance.63 Lum et al. perceive and note these same difficulties 
playing out in the domain of BWCs.64 
BWCs implicate police discretion beyond simply questions of 
activation. BWCs also allow for much greater oversight by superiors 
                                                 
 60. Paoline, supra note 58, at 209–10. 
 61. Lum et al., supra note 57 at 135. 
 62. Id. at 155. 
 63. See id. 
 64. Id. at 157 (noting that “how police officers perceive and use body-worn cameras 
may be quite different from the community’s intended objectives .	.	. because of the 
technological frames by which they are filtered). 
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(and, in case of public access to footage, society), and officers may 
thus experience a lessened degree of autonomy and discretion on the 
job.65 The ability to exercise discretion has been linked to job 
satisfaction66 and, due to police work’s inherent complexity, 
discretion has been described as being “at the core of police 
functioning.”67 A qualitative study by Koen found that BWCs 
moderately affect officer discretion.68 While noting that no 
fundamental change had taken place in the way in which police 
officers made their decisions, some did feel their discretion had 
diminished: one-third of patrol officers responded that they used less 
discretion.69 As expected, several officers explained that this was due 
to the now increased possibility of being scrutinized for their 
discretionary decisions.70 
The steady flow of controversies in the news reveal that the issue 
of missing camera footage during critical incidents remains pervasive. 
Those in favor of affording officers a high degree of discretion cite 
privacy concerns and argue that effective policing is built on trust. 
While some of the alleged benefits from strict activation policies and 
consequences for non-compliance have indeed been disputed, there is 
nevertheless a strong basis in the literature to support the claim that 
these play significant roles in camera activation by officers. At the 
same time, the literature also reveals that officers’ willingness to 
activate the camera should be approached with an understanding of 
the technological frames held by the officers within any given 
organization. Many officers view BWCs as something that limits their 
autonomy and runs counter to their ideas of efficiency and primary 
job functions. To understand how, when, and why police officers may 
refuse to comply with activation policy, a deeper comprehension of 
                                                 
 65. See Koen, supra note 10, at 71–79 (examining how BWCs have impacted police 
discretion and concluding that it has had a “moderate” impact). 
 66. See Richard R. Johnson, Police Officer Job Satisfaction: A Multidimensional 
Analysis, 15(2) POLICE Q. 157, 170 (2012). 
 67. Ariel et al., supra note 5, at 457 (quoting GEORGE L. KELLING, NAT’L INST. OF 
JUSTICE, “BROKEN WINDOWS” AND POLICE DISCRETION 6 (1999)). 
 68. Koen, supra note 10, at 73. 
 69. Id. at 73, 78. Discretion here, for example, entails letting someone off with a 
warning rather than a citation, i.e., being more “legalistic.” Id. at 73–74. 
 70. Id. at 75–76. 
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police cultures and the way in which they frame and consequently 
perceive new technologies is key. 
II.  METHODS AND DEMOGRAPHICS 
A.  Methods 
The findings presented in this Article are drawn from both 
qualitative and quantitative data collected through fieldwork 
(interviews, observation, ride-alongs) and surveys of police officers in 
two municipal police agencies in Washington State71—namely, the 
Bellingham Police Department (“BPD”) and Spokane Police 
Department (“SPD”). Data collection encompassed forty ride-alongs 
with twenty-nine different officers, ranging in duration from a few 
hours to entire ten-hour-and-forty-minute shifts; a variety of 
additional informal discussions with other officers and department 
administrators, and a series of four surveys administered in 2014, 
2015, 2016, and 2017-2018, respectively. Ride-alongs were conducted 
primarily by one of the authors (Newell), although some of the later 
rides were conducted by doctoral students from the University of 
Washington after being trained on study protocols for data collection. 
The interviews that occurred during ride-alongs were informal and 
not audio-recorded, although detailed written and audio-recorded 
field notes were made during breaks and shortly after each ride. 
Many of the questions asked on the questionnaires were also 
addressed during interviews and discussions with officers throughout 
the fieldwork. The survey questionnaires, which were designed 
primarily to inform and build upon the qualitative investigation and, 
as appropriate, validate whether certain themes drawn from the 
qualitative work were more generalizable across the two departments, 
resulted in 148, 133, 126, and 102 valid responses, respectively, across 
both departments. 
The first survey was administered just before and during each 
department’s initial BWC pilot, from September to December 2014. 
The earliest responses (BPD, n = 29) were collected on paper during 
                                                 
 71. The general methods and respondent demographic information of this study have 
been reported previously in Newell, supra note 4, 1381–84. Because this Section uses the 
same dataset, much of the text here draws from that earlier paper. 
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initial body-camera training meetings and prior to the actual 
deployment of cameras by that agency. The remaining responses to 
the first survey (n = 119) were collected (from both departments) 
online between October and December 2014. The next two surveys 
were administered online in May/June 2015 and June 2016, 
respectively. The fourth survey was administered in June 2017 within 
BPD and, due to administrative request, from mid-December 2017 to 
mid-January 2018 within SPD.72 Officers (including front-line officers, 
supervisors, and detectives) were sent an email containing a link to 
the online questionnaire by a member of each department’s 
administrative leadership along with a brief description of the 
research and a statement that participation was encouraged but 
entirely voluntary. Officers were presented with an information 
statement outlining the risks and benefits of participation prior to 
taking the survey. 
On all four surveys, officers were asked qualitative and 
quantitative questions designed to elicit their attitudes and concerns 
about the use of BWCs within their agencies. On each survey, officers 
were asked how frequently they felt BWCs should be activated in 
different contexts (a normative question). For example, officers were 
asked questions such as: “In your opinion, how often should wearable 
cameras be used by police officers [to record encounters with 
civilians?]” On the latter three surveys, officers who reported having 
previously used a BWC were also asked to self-report how frequently 
they activated their cameras in these same contexts. Of course, these 
self-reported responses should not be read as necessarily being an 
accurate proxy for how frequently cameras were actually activated, 
but it is interesting to compare officers’ normative judgments about 
activation with how they characterize their own activation practices, 
especially when they self-report activating less frequently than they 
report they should be.73 All four surveys included questions about 
                                                 
 72. The questionnaire was scheduled to be administered in June 2017, to coincide 
with the administration in Bellingham, but it was delayed at the request of the department 
due to the volume of surveys the Spokane Police Department’s officers had been asked to 
complete in early 2017 (from other sources). 
 73. As another note of caution, it is not clear from our data whether, or how much, 
existing departmental activation policies impacted officers’ responses to either the 
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activation during all police-public interactions (the example question 
above), during arrest situations, and during traffic stops, while 
additional context-based prompts were added on Survey 2 (recording 
inside homes and during domestic violence calls) and on Survey 3 
(recording inside medical facilities, recording witness and victim 
statements). 
Officers were also asked Likert-scale questions about whether 
they felt the use of BWCs would decrease their ability to use 
discretion in their work and how likely they thought it was that BWC 
use would expose officers to increased numbers of disciplinary 
actions. In addition to these quantitative measures, respondents were 
also asked the following open-ended question: “What discretion 
should officers have about when to record? – for instance, should 
officers be required to record ALL encounters with civilians? Why or 
why not?” Findings regarding officers’ privacy-related concerns, 
primarily as they related to public disclosure under state access to 
information laws, were reported previously.74 
B.  Agency and Respondent Demographics 
At the midpoint of the study, BPD employed over 110 sworn 
personnel, with over 60 personnel assigned to patrol (including K-9), 
and over 50 non-sworn civilian personnel. The department had 
jurisdiction over 31.7 square miles and served a population of over 
83,000 citizens. At the same point in time, SPD employed over 310 
sworn personnel, with over 140 personnel assigned to patrol, and just 
over 100 non-sworn civilian personnel. The department had a 
jurisdiction of roughly 76 square miles and served a population of 
over 210,000 citizens. 
Across all four surveys, the vast majority of respondents were 
male, ranging from 83.7% (BPD, Survey 2) to 92.6% (SPD, Survey 4). 
The low number of female respondents (ranging from 4.4% to 16.3% 
by department, per survey) does limit the generalizability of analyzing 
                                                                                                                 
normative or descriptive questions about how frequently activation should occur or had 
occurred. 
 74. For findings regarding officers’ privacy-related concerns, primarily as they related 
to public disclosure under state access to information laws, see Newell, supra note 4, at 
1335, 1381, 1384–93. 
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results by sex, but the response rate does generally reflect the overall 
demographic composition of the two departments. At the midpoint of 
the study, the total population of sworn officers at BPD was 
approximately 84.0% male and 16.0% female, and the total 
population of SPD employees (not just sworn officers) was 75.6% 
male and 24.4% female.75 Qualitative interviews and ride-alongs were 
also conducted with a sample of officers that generally matched these 
populations (predominantly male but including some female officers 
as well; five of the forty ride-alongs were conducted with three 
different female officers). 
 




1 50 88.0% 12.0% - 
2 49 83.7% 16.3% - 
3 56 85.7% 12.5% 1.8% 
4 36 85.3% 11.8% 2.9% 
SPD 
1 98 88.8% 9.2% 2.0% 
2 84 90.5% 7.1% 2.4% 
3 70 88.6% 5.7% 5.7% 
4 68 92.6% 4.4% 2.9% 
Combined 
1 148 88.5% 10.1% 1.4% 
2 133 88.0% 10.5% 1.5% 
3 126 87.3% 8.7% 4.0% 
4 102 90.2% 6.9% 2.9% 
Table 1. Sex of Respondents (by Department) Across the Four 
Surveys. 
                                                 
 75. We were not able to get precise numbers for just the sworn personnel at SPD. 
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Most respondents on each survey reported being between thirty-
five and fifty-four years of age, with very few reporting being under 
twenty-four or older than sixty-four. Likewise, those we interviewed 
during ride-alongs were also generally between the ages of twenty-
four and fifty-four. 
 
Survey n 18–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+ NR 
1 148 0.7% 16.2% 42.6% 33.1% 5.4% - 2.0% 
2 133 - 9.0% 43.6% 37.6% 7.5% 0.8% 1.5% 
3 126 0.8% 8.7% 33.3% 44.4% 8.7% - 4.0% 
4 102 - 13.7% 33.3% 44.1% 6.9% - 2.0% 
Table 2. Ages of Respondents Across All Four Surveys. 
 
The majority of respondents on each survey reported having 
worked in a law enforcement capacity for more than ten years, with 
only a very small number reporting less than five years of professional 
law enforcement experience. Regarding the ride-alongs, most officers 
we interviewed had more than five years of experience, but a few 
were also newer officers (a couple having only recently completed 
their field training). 
 
Survey n < 1 yr 1–2 yrs 3–5 yrs 5–10 yrs > 10 yrs NR 
1 148 2.0% 0.7% 5.4% 21.6% 68.9% 1.4% 
2 133 - 1.5% 1.5% 13.5% 82.0% 1.5% 
3 126 - 0.8% 2.4% 14.3% 79.4% 3.2% 
4 102 - 2.0% 7.8% 7.8% 80.4% 2.0% 
Table 3. Reported Time in Law Enforcement Across All Four 
Surveys. 
 
Across the four surveys, regular officers (patrol, traffic, crime 
prevention, etc., including both junior and senior patrol officers) 
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constituted between 45.1% and 63.5% of all respondents. Between 
23.6% and 30.4% of respondents on each survey reported serving in 
supervisory positions (designated “Supervisor” in Figures 3a–3c), 
including corporal (SPD only), sergeant, lieutenant, captain (SPD 
only), and major (SPD only). Additionally, between 7.9% and 11.3% 
of respondents reported being detectives or crime scene investigators. 
Ride-alongs were conducted primarily with regular patrol officers but 
also included three sergeants, two corporals, and one crime scene 
investigator. Additional interviews and informal conversations were 
conducted with higher ranking members of the departments’ 
command staff, civilian staff, and additional patrol officers. 
All respondents to each survey reported having attended college 
or university, with a majority on each survey having earned a four-
year baccalaureate degree. Approximately 20% of respondents 
reported having obtained a two-year associates degree, and between 
2.7% and 7.8% having obtained a graduate degree. This question was 
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Response(s) 
Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 Survey 4 
n % n % n % n % 
Major - - - - - - 1 1.0 
Captain 1 0.7 3 2.3 3 2.4 2 2.0 
Lieutenant 8 5.4 10 7.5 8 6.3 6 5.9 
Sergeant 22* 14.9 19* 14.3 20* 15.9 21* 20.6 
Corporal 4 2.7 5 3.8 5 4.0 1 1.0 
Detective/CSI 12* 8.1 15* 11.3 10* 7.9 9* 8.8 
Senior 
Officer** 28 18.9 21 15.8 14 11.1 13 12.7 
Officer 66 44.6 42 31.6 46 36.5 33 32.4 
Admin/Other - - - - 1 0.8 1 1.0 
Did not 
report 
8 5.4 19 14.3 20 15.9 17 16.7 
TOTAL 148  133  126  102  
* Includes one or more response where the rank of “Sergeant” and the position of 
“Detective” were both indicated. In these cases, respondents were coded as both (and 
as supervisors). 
** Only applies to SPD, as BPD does not separate these officers into junior and senior 
ranks. 
Table 4. Reported Rank/Position of Respondents, by Survey. 
 
Roughly 84% to 87% of respondents on each survey reported 
being “White,” with small percentages of respondents identifying as 
“Hispanic,” “Black/African-American,” “American Indian/Alaska 
Native,” “Asian,” or “Hawaiian/Pacific Islander” (see Table 5, 
below). These responses generally match the populations at both 
departments, as BPD’s population is approximately 90% White, 5.4% 
Asian and Pacific Islander, and 4.5% Black/African-American (with a 
few employees who identify as Hispanic in addition to one of the 
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previous categories). On the other hand, SPD’s population is 
approximately 91.9% White, 3.0% Hispanic, 1.5% Black/African-
American, 1.5% American Indian/Alaska Native, and 1.8% 
Asian/Hawaiian/Pacific Islander (with another 1.0% “Other”). Ride-
alongs were primarily conducted with white officers, although some 
informal interviews were conducted with non-white officers. 
 
Response(s) 
Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 Survey 4 
n % n % n % n % 
White 130 87.8% 116 87.2% 107 84.9% 86 84.3% 
Black/African 
American 
3 2.0% 2 1.5% 2 1.6% 2 2.0% 
Asian 2* 1.4% 2 1.5% 3*** 2.4% 2* 2.0% 




3* 2.0% 4* 3.0% 2 1.6% 0 0.0% 
Hawaiian/Pacific 
Islander 1 0.7% 1 0.8% 1
*** 0.8% 1 1.0% 
Other 2** 1.4% 4** 3.0% 3** 2.4% 3 2.9% 
No Response 6 4.1% 7 5.3% 11 8.7% 7 6.9% 
Total 148 - 133 - 126 - 102  
* Includes one or more response where “White” was also selected as a primary racial 
category. 
** Responses include: [blank], “American,” “‘Merican,” and “Human.” 
*** Includes one response indicating both “Asian” and “Native Hawaiian/Pacific 
Islander.” 
Table 5. Reported Racial/Ethnic Backgrounds of Respondents, 
by Survey. 
 
In terms of political attitudes, the highest percentages of 
respondents generally reported their political leanings as being 
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“conservative” (24.5% to 32.5% across surveys) or “moderate 
conservative” (27.7% to 35.3%), followed by a smaller number of 
respondents who reported being “moderate” (16.7% to 22.6%). Only 
very small numbers of respondents (fewer than 6%) reported being 
on the “liberal” side of the political spectrum, while 7.9% to 11.8% 
reported being “very conservative.” This question was not generally 
discussed during informal interviews. 
III.  FINDINGS 
In the subsections below, we detail (1) officers’ normative 
assessments about activation, including what officers reported was the 
appropriate level of activation in each of these contexts as well as 
their self-reported perceptions about whether BWCs would diminish 
officer discretion; and (2) how frequently officers self-reported 
actually activating their cameras in these same contexts (as a point of 
comparison to officers’ normative responses). 
A. Desired Levels of Discretion 
Most of the responding officers reported that some degree of 
discretion regarding camera activation was appropriate, although a 
minority did support the “always on, no discretion” approach. Those 
officers who did support always-on activation policies often cited trust 
(or the lack of trust) as a primary reason for opposing officer 
discretion in activation policies—framing the requirement to “record 
everything” as a mechanism to preemptively shield officers against 
unjustified criticism or unfounded claims of misconduct by 
supervisors, the media, and the public. One sergeant, assigned to an 
internal affairs unit, stressed that activation was important “to avoid 
the accusation that [officers] are ‘selectively’ recording incidents to 
avoid showing bad behavior,” adding that he has “seen the cameras 
work to the advantage of officers more times than not.” 
Officers’ desire to protect themselves by documenting police-
public contacts also appears to stem from the feeling held by some 
officers that “every contact is a potential threat and should be 
recorded.” This focus on overcoming mistrust by documenting all 
their police-public interactions was often complemented by officers’ 
stated belief that their departments were not full of “bad apples” and 
deserved more respect from members of their communities. Some 
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officers expressed strong opinions on this issue. As one officer 
explained, “[t]he main reason to record all encounters is to make sure 
that the officer is protected from false accusations of misconduct. The 
officers of the [department] are professional and ethical people. They 
do not abuse anyone.” Another noted, “If the citizens think we can’t 
be trusted they shouldn’t be bitching when we record everything! I 
think we should record every encounter with a citizen.” 
Some officers reported that they saw frequent activation as a 
means of producing video that could inform citizens about what real, 
daily, police work looked like, with the hope of educating the public 
about both the boring and stressful aspects of their jobs. One officer 
expressed this sentiment by explaining that “[t]he public wants to see 
what we do and the best way for them [to do so] is to see how we deal 
with a high stress situation.” Others echoed concerns about officers 
not wanting to engage with the cameras at all; for example, one 
officer expressed the sentiment that “there has to be an all-activation 
approach or else some cops would never turn it on.” Others felt that 
frequent activation was important because it resulted in the collection 
of better evidence to use in prosecuting the cases they investigated. 
Alternatively, some officers noted that “unpredictability of police 
work” and the difficulty of knowing, ex ante, whether an interaction 
should be recorded worked in favor of limited discretion. 
Yet, some officers also felt that any attempt to record everything 
was “an exercise in futility” because, as one lieutenant stated, “[i]t 
doesn’t matter, because the one time you forget, or don’t [record,] 
people will say you were hiding something.” A sergeant stated 
forcefully: “Any application of officer discretion to not record would 
be viewed as deliberate intent to conceal unacceptable conduct. 
Remove all discretion. Record everything and watch ‘productivity’ go 
into a free fall.” Additionally, some officers in favor of recording all 
encounters also expressed concerns that they would be punished for 
forgetting to activate their cameras in every situation they 
encountered. 
Responses to the quantitative survey questions are generally 
consistent with these qualitative findings. Notably, a small percentage 
of officers reported that cameras should “always” be activated during 
encounters with members of the public (15.5%, 17.3%, 15.1%, and 
9.8%, respectively, by survey). However, when asked about activation 
in other, more specific, contexts, these percentages generally 
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increased. For example, closer to half of the respondents reported 
that cameras should “always” be activated during arrest situations. 
Table 6, below, includes more details. 
 
Context 
“Always” (%)  “Always” or “Most of 
the Time” (%) 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S1 S2 S3 S4 
All public 
encounters 
15.5    17.3 15.1 9.8 51.4   52.6 55.6 53.9 
Arrest 
situations 42.6    51.1 51.6 
63.7 77.7   88.0 93.7 90.2 
Traffic stops 41.2    45.9 48.4    53.9 75.7   78.2 90.5 86.3 
Inside 
homes 








- - 7.9 4.9 - - 32.5 30.4 
Witness 
statements - - 27.0 
30.4 - - 65.1 70.6 
Victim 
statements 
- - 21.4 28.4 - - 61.1 65.7 
Table 6. Percentage of Officers Who Reported That BWCs 
Should Be Activated “Always” or “Most of the Time” During 
Each Context, by Survey. 
 
As depicted in Figure 1, officers also reported that activation 
should happen more frequently across contexts as time went on. 
Officer opinion that BWC activation should happen during most or 
all public-police interactions (that is, combining responses for 
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“always” or “most of the time”) rose slightly across surveys (51.4%, 
52.6%, 55.6%, 53.9%), as it did for arrests (77.7%, 88.0%, 93.7%, 
90.2%), traffic stops (75.7%, 78.2%, 90.5%, 86.3%), recording inside 
homes (42.1%, 54.8%, 62.7%), and during domestic violence calls 
(74.4%, 86.5%, 84.3%). 
 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of Respondents Who Indicated BWCs 
Should Be Activated “Always” or “Most of the Time” in Each 
Context, Across Both Departments. 
 
However, as we see from Figures 2a and 2b, the responses varied 
by department, with SPD officers consistently more likely to report 
that frequent BWC activation was appropriate in certain 
circumstances; in some cases, they were considerably more likely to 
be in favor of more frequent activation.76 There may be many 
                                                 
 76. On Survey 1, SPD respondents were significantly more likely than BPD 
respondents to support more frequent activation during all police-public encounters (U = 
1777.5, Z = -2.857, p = 0.004) and during traffic stops (U = 1838, Z = -2.637, p = .008), but 
not during arrest situations. On Survey 2, SPD respondents were significantly more likely 
than BPD respondents to support more frequent activation during arrest situations (U = 













Survey 1 51.4% 77.7% 75.7%
Survey 2 52.6% 88.0% 78.2% 74.4% 42.1%
Survey 3 55.6% 93.7% 90.5% 86.5% 65.1% 61.1% 54.8% 32.5%
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variables that contributed to these differences, although it is difficult 
to say what the specific causes might have been. Some of this variance 
may be attributable to different activation policies in effect in each 
department. This seems especially likely in the case of recording 
inside homes, as BPD officers were instructed, at one point early in 
their body-camera pilot, to not record inside private residences due to 
privacy-related concerns. In any case, these findings suggest that BPD 
officers understood BWCs as appropriate tools in a particular range 
of circumstances—including during arrests, traffic stops, and domestic 
violence calls—but not necessarily in terms of constant recording or 
with the purpose of capturing all interactions an officer might have 
over the course of a shift. SPD officers, on the other hand, appeared 
to understand BWCs more as broadly applicable tools, useful across a 













                                                                                                                 
inside private homes (U = 1650, Z = -1.992, p = .046). The difference for recording during 
all police-public encounters was not significant, but marginally so (U = 1661.5, Z = -1.952, 
p = .051). On Survey 3, SPD respondents were statistically more likely to support frequent 
activation in every context except arrest situations: during all police-public encounters (U 
= 1157.5, Z = -4.127, p < .001), during traffic stops (U = 1525.5, Z = -2.367, p = .018), while 
recording inside homes (U = 864, Z = -5.630, p < .001) and medical facilities (U = 1389.5, Z 
= -2.920, p = .003), while recording witness statements (U = 815.5, Z = -5.879, p < .001) and 
victim statements (U = 812.5, Z = -5.892, p < .001), and during domestic violence calls (U = 
1590, Z = -1.987, p = .047). Finally, on Survey 4, SPD respondents were statistically more 
likely to support frequent activation during all police-public encounters (U = 858.5, Z = -
2.237, p < .025), while recording inside homes (U = 792.5, Z = -2.737, p = .006) and medical 
facilities (U = 838, Z = -2.395, p = .017), and while recording witness statements (U = 
625.5, Z = -3.967, p < .001) and victim statements (U = 601.5, Z = -4.116, p < .001). 
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 Figure 2a. Percentage of Respondents Who Indicated BWCs 
Should Be Activated “Always” or “Most of the Time” in Each 
Context, by Department, from Surveys 1, 2. 
 
 
Figure 2b. Percentage of Respondents Who Indicated BWCs 
Should Be Activated “Always” or “Most of the Time” in Each 
Context, by Department, from Surveys 3, 4. 
All Arrests Trafficstops DV calls
Inside
homes
BPD (S1) 32.0% 70.0% 64.0%
BPD (S2) 42.9% 85.7% 73.5% 65.3% 26.5%
SPD (S1) 61.2% 81.6% 81.6%























BPD (S3) 37.5% 91.1% 85.7% 78.6% 37.5% 30.4% 25.0% 16.1%
BPD (S4) 35.3% 97.1% 94.1% 91.2% 50.0% 38.2% 44.1% 11.8%
SPD (S3) 70.0% 95.7% 94.3% 92.9% 87.1% 85.7% 78.6% 45.7%
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The response to these questions also varied substantially by rank, 
with those in more senior or supervisory roles more in favor of 
frequent activation than those assigned as regular patrol officers (in 
terms of raw percentages). This unsurprising finding is true for every 
context across all four surveys and, in some cases, the percentage 
difference is greater than 30 points. When comparing “Supervisors” 
with “Officers” combined across both departments, we find 
statistically significant differences.77 For example, on Survey 3, 
supervisors reported that frequent activation was appropriate during 
all police-public encounters at a rate of 78.4% compared to 46.7% of 
regular front-line officers. A much higher percentage of supervisors 
also reported that recording inside homes should occur frequently 
than regular patrol officers did (67.6% compared to 41.7%), as 











                                                 
 77. On Survey 1, respondents who reported being Supervisors were significantly more 
likely than those who reported being (non-supervisor) Officers to support more frequent 
activation in all three contexts: during all police-public encounters (U = 1136.5, Z = -2.810, 
p = 0.005), during arrest situations (U = 1247, Z = -2.260, p = .024), and during traffic stops 
(U = 1233.5, Z = -2.323, p = .020) (this analysis excludes those in the Unknown category). 
On Survey 2, Supervisors were significantly more likely than Officers to support more 
frequent activation during arrest situations (U = 767.5, Z = -3.072, p = .002) and during 
traffic stops (U = 824.5, Z = -2.515, p = .012). On Survey 3, SPD Supervisors were 
statistically more likely than Officers to support frequent activation in every context 
except domestic violence calls: during all police-public encounters (U = 742.5, Z = -2.875, p 
= .004), during arrest situations (U = 772.5, Z = -2.827, p = .005), during traffic stops (U = 
781.5, Z = -2.448, p = .006), while recording inside homes (U = 792, Z = -2.448, p < .014) 
and medical facilities (U = 779.5, Z = -2.561, p = .010), and while recording witness 
statements (U = 781.5, Z = -2.537, p < .011) and victim statements (U = 829, Z = -2.168, p < 
.030). Finally, on Survey 4, Supervisors were statistically more likely to support frequent 
activation during all police-public encounters (U = 470.5, Z = -2.713, p < .007), but not in 
other contexts. 
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Figure 3a. Percentage of Respondents Who Indicated BWCs 
Should Be Activated “Always” or “Most of the Time” in Each 





















Sup. (S1) 71.4% 88.6% 94.3% 0.0% 0.0%
Ofc. (S1) 45.7% 74.5% 69.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Unk. (S1) 42.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Sup. (S2) 63.9% 97.2% 88.9% 83.3% 44.4%
Ofc. (S2) 43.8% 82.8% 67.2% 71.9% 40.6%
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Figure 3b. Percentage of Respondents Who Indicated BWCs 
Should Be Activated “Always” or “Most of the Time” in Each 
Context, by Seniority, from Survey 3. 
 
 
Figure 3c. Percentage of Respondents Who Indicated BWCs 
Should Be Activated “Always” or “Most of the Time” in Each 












Supervisors 78.4% 100.0% 97.3% 89.2% 75.7% 70.3% 67.6% 43.2%
Officers 46.7% 88.3% 86.7% 81.7% 53.3% 50.0% 41.7% 26.7%























Supervisors 80.6% 100.0% 100.0% 93.5% 87.1% 77.4% 71.0% 38.7%
Officers 45.7% 87.0% 82.6% 87.0% 65.2% 58.7% 63.0% 23.9%
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As stated above, most officers did support some amount of 
officer discretion about when to record. For these officers, discretion 
provided a means to have more honest, trusted, and authentic 
interactions with members of the public (as well as other officers); to 
avoid violating privacy or recording extremely sensitive (and 
potentially embarrassing or traumatic) situations or statements; and 
to minimize the amount of work required to annotate, tag, and 
sometimes watch footage. As outlined by one detective: 
Officers should not be required to record all interactions with 
the public. The majority of contacts are non-criminal in nature. 
People should be able to feel they can approach officers, 
without fear or concern they are going to be recorded. The 
camera could have a dampening effect on reporting crimes, if 
people believe they are always being recorded. 
These concerns were compounded by liberal public disclosure 
requirements in local public records law and officer perceptions that 
the video they produced was likely to be disclosed to the public and 
end up online (e.g., on YouTube.com).78 In this regard, one senior 
patrol officer stated: 
I don’t have an issue recording every issue with citizens. 
However, the video should not be so easy to get through a 
[public] records request for just anybody to view. On incidents 
with a bridge jumper, for example, I feel we should record that, 
but we shouldn’t have to tell the person we are recording so 
they don’t think they have an audience. We should still record it 
for future civil law suits.  
Several officers were concerned that citizens would be less 
willing to disclose information if officers could not choose to turn off 
their cameras. Officers also frequently cited privacy and sensitivity-
related concerns (e.g., when interviewing rape victims or speaking to 
informants). The threat to citizen privacy was often viewed through 
the lens of public disclosure. Various officers suggested limits on who 
could access video or, at least, that they should have the flexibility to 
turn off a camera during sexual assault (and other sensitive) calls. The 
                                                 
 78. For more details about the local public disclosure law and officers’ perceptions 
towards public disclosure of their footage, see Newell, supra note 4, at 1363–80, 1384–93.  
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feeling that a “rape victim’s statements should not be accessible to a 
simple public information request” was not appropriate because it 
“could victimize them further” was echoed by several officers; others 
stated that officers should be able to choose not to record “citizens in 
mental crisis, medical crisis, or victims of a crime” when public 
disclosure was possible or likely. One officer stated, “Officer’s should 
have discretion. I’ve dealt with people whose loved one passed away 
naturally and they didn’t want it recorded for someone to get a copy 
and post it on the internet.” Here, too, some officers appear to view 
discretion as a tool by which officers can protect bystanders and non-
criminal persons of interest from the public disclosure laws that many 
of them disagree with in the first place.79 Some officers also refer to 
other types of threats which may follow from public disclosure (for 
example, burglars staking out a house prior to breaking and 
entering).80 Officer privacy was also mentioned as a reason for 
allowing discretion. Officers were concerned that their private 
conversations (both with friends, family, or other colleagues) might 
be recorded and become subject to public disclosure requests. 
Similarly, some officers also expressed concern over certain actions 
being misinterpreted when viewed by others. As one officer 
remarked, “[officers] sometimes vent or laugh as a coping mechanism 
and it could be misunderstood” by outside viewers. Likewise, in 
survey responses, almost half of the officers agreed that “wearing a 
body camera will diminish officer discretion (e.g. to not issue a 
citation in certain circumstances).”  
The tension between documenting everything to protect 
themselves and capture evidence and the risks to others that 
recording might impose was felt acutely by some officers. For 
example, at one point during a ride-along, an officer arrested a known 
gang member who also happened to be the officer’s confidential 
informant. After recording the arrest, the officer turned the camera 
off and sat down in the back seat of the patrol car with the arrestee to 
talk. After a few minutes, the officer emerged from the back of the 
                                                 
79. See id. 
80. We are not aware of any incidents where something like this has actually occurred. 
It seems unlikely that these concerns are based on prior experience, or that such an issue 
presents a particularly pressing problem. 
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car, turned his camera back on, and proceeded to record the rest of 
our drive to the local jail where the arrestee was booked. On one 
hand, recording such a conversation with an informant could increase 
the risk to the informant, should others find out he or she had talked. 
On the other hand, the gap in the recording could likewise subject the 
arrestee to risk, at least when public disclosure laws require the 
release of such footage upon request, and it could also potentially 
open the officer to undocumented claims of misconduct. 
 
 
Figure 4. Responses to the Question: “Wearing a Body Camera 
Will Diminish Officer Discretion (e.g. To Not Issue a Citation 
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On the latter three surveys, 48.1%, 46.8%, and 50.0% of 
respondents, respectively, agreed that BWCs would limit officer 
discretion, while 45.1%, 35.7%, and 29.4%, respectively, disagreed. 
Only 17.3%, 12.7%, and 13.7%, respectively strongly disagreed, while 
12%, 19.8%, and 14.7%, respectively, strongly agreed. There was 
some difference between departments, although the differences were 
not always in the same direction (BPD officers reported 40.8% 
agreement on Survey 2, compared to 52.4% of SPD officers; 50% 
compared to 44.3% on Survey 3; and 38.2% compared to 55.9% on 
Survey 4). 
Officers exercise discretion in a broad sense throughout their line 
of work. BWCs may restrict their willingness and perceived ability to 
exercise discretion in several ways. Our data is consistent with that of 
other authors in the sense that many officers are concerned about 
“Monday-morning quarterbacking.”81 As one officer remarked, 
“[Monday-morning quarterbacking] is already occurring. The current 
trend is to hand out as much discipline as possible to officers for any 
situation which is handled less than perfectly in the opinion of that 
particular captain. Cameras aid in that process.”  
Officers also fear that the public (and in some cases, supervisors) 
do not understand the nuances of policing and what is sometimes 
required to achieve an effective outcome. One quote stood out in the 
sense that it reveals how important discretion can be but how it could 
simultaneously be misconstrued:  
Anyone who has tried talking with a known street criminal with 
a “Hello sir the reason I’m contacting you today.	.	.” will 
instantly lose credibility with this contact, thus compromising 
officer safety. But if you approach this same street criminal with 
a “Bro, what’s the word on the street?” you’ll be called a racist, 
insensitive or otherwise unprofessional. 
These tensions are reminiscent of the discrepancy described by 
He et al.: on the one hand, police work requires officers to exercise a 
great deal of discretion but, on the other, they are strongly bound by 
administrative rules (as police organizations are highly bureaucratic 
                                                 
 81. See, e.g., Koen, supra note 10, at 73 (noting “[o]ne of the more common phrases 
mentioned by [the] officers during interviews was: ‘Monday morning quarterbacking,’” 
which refers to the public’s ex post facto judgment about an officer’s decision making). 
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in nature), and this causes additional stress.82 In this case, however, 
the discrepancy concerns unwritten rules of social convention to 
which officers are subjected. 
Interestingly, very few respondents on the first three surveys 
(8.1%, 4.5%, and 9.5%, by survey and across departments) reported 
that BWC use was “very likely” to lead to increased numbers of 
disciplinary actions against officers. Similarly, combining “very likely” 
or “somewhat likely” responses only captured only about 20–30% of 
the total across these three surveys (see Figure 5). A supervisor with 
some experience in the Internal Affairs division of one of the 
departments stated that BWCs generally “protect officers against 




Figure 5: Percentage of Respondents who Indicated BWC Use 
Was “Very Likely” or “Somewhat Likely” to Increase the 
Number of Disciplinary Actions Brought Against Officers, by 
Department. 
 
We also see that higher percentages of regular officers generally 
reported agreement that BWCs would lead to increased discipline 
                                                 
 82. See Ni He, Jihong Zhao & Carol A. Archbold, Gender and Police Stress: The 
Convergent and Divergent Impact of Work Environment, Work-Family Conflict, and Stress 
Coping Mechanisms of Female and Male Police Officers, 25 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE 
STRATEGIES & MGMT. 687, 690–91 (2002) (noting the conflict caused by the requirement 
that officers “exercise considerable discretion while being tightly controlled by a plethora 
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than did supervisors (see Figure 6). On Survey 4, however, while BPD 
respondents indicated roughly similar responses (2.9% very likely, 
14.7% somewhat likely), SPD respondents reported that increased 
disciplinary action was much more likely, at 58.8% indicating that 
such an increase was “very likely” and an additional 30.9% indicating 
it was “somewhat likely” (see Figures 5 and 6 for related data). It is 
unclear from our data what drove this spike, but it likely reflects 
either officer experience during the intervening period or altered 
expectations based on a change in departmental leadership (as a new 
chief of police with a stated commitment to departmental 
accountability to the Spokane community was hired in the intervening 
period83). As one officer put it, “recently it appears the Department is 
overly consumed with whether or not our cameras are on as if we are 
not trusted.” Some officers also felt strongly that the cameras were 
being used unjustly by administrators as accountability tools. In the 
words of one officer, administrators had begun “imposing their own 
morals and opinions on my actions,” an indication that the 
department’s “policy protects the administration, but the officers 
have minimal protection from admin, and zero from the public 
release of every word spoken on every day in every scenario by 
people who condemn a single misspoken sentence as though we are 
murderers.” 
Additionally, one SPD officer who had transitioned into 
investigations after initially being assigned a BWC reported, on 
Survey 4, a continuing “fear of being disciplined even though nothing 
was done wrong” due to perceived lack of clarity about how the law 
applied to the use of BWCs and officer accountability. Other officers 
also expressed concerns that “footage is not used by [the] 
prosecutor’s office and is only being used for [officer] discipline.” 
Similarly, another officer expressed concerns that, “if the officer sees 
something that is not captured on the camera, the assumption will be 
                                                 
 83. See Mitch Ryals, Craig Meidl Named Chief of Spokane Police Department, 
INLANDER (Aug. 1, 2016, 12:48 PM), https://www.inlander.com/Bloglander/archives/2016
/08/01/craig-meidl-named-chief-of-spokane-police-department [https://perma.cc/7A2B-
5FH7]; Shawn Vestal, Shawn Vestal: Spokane Police Chief Craig Meidl has Defied the 
Fears of his Critics to Become a Model Leader, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Dec. 17, 2017, 6:00 
AM), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2017/dec/17/shawn-vestal-spokane-police-chief-
craig-meidl-has-/ [https://perma.cc/S8RA-4QJY]. 
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made that it didn’t occur, and the officer’s integrity will be called into 
question.” Another elaborated a little more: “Right now, we’re 
having issues getting our footage into court and then having it used 
against us when it does get in (e.g., officers discussing [probable 
cause] and defense saying we didn’t know what we were doing). It’s a 
double edge sword in court right now.” Beyond general 
accountability for disciplining officers, one officer expressed the 
concern that “police and city administration” might use BWC footage 
“to identify and target officers who do not share the same 
religious/political beliefs.” It is likely that these sorts of concerns in 
combination with a lingering lack of clarity or understanding about 
the law’s application to the use of BWCs and related accountability 
processes amongst officers could have contributed to the spike in 
responses indicating that disciplinary action was a likely result 
stemming from BWC deployment. 
  
 
Figure 6: Percentage of Respondents Who Indicated BWC Use 
Was “Very Likely” or “Somewhat Likely” to Increase the 
Number of Disciplinary Actions Brought Against Officers, by 














Survey 1 27.3% 37.5% 57.1% 8.3% 30.6% 16.7%
Survey 2 16.7% 29.2% 7.7% 12.5% 35.0% 5.0%
Survey 3 0.0% 43.3% 41.7% 34.8% 36.7% 5.9%
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Relatedly, on Survey 4, while a third to more than half of BPD 
respondents across categories (supervisor, officer, or unknown) 
reported that increased disciplinary actions were “somewhat 
unlikely” or “very unlikely” to arise as a consequence of BWC use, 
very few SPD respondents responded similarly (with only 5.6% of 
supervisors indicating “somewhat unlikely”; see Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7: Responses to Question About How Likely BWC Use 
Would Lead to Increase Numbers of Disciplinary Actions 
Against Officers, by Department and Rank (Supervisor, 
Officer, or Unknown), on Survey 4. 
 
Discounting the spike by SPD respondents in Survey 4, we 
expected more responses to indicate a “very likely” expectation than 
turned out to be the case. Because our qualitative responses show a 
recurring emphasis on themes of accountability and concerns over 
Monday-morning quarterbacking, we initially theorized that this 
would be reflected through strong expectations of increased 
disciplinary actions. However, it is quite possible that officers were 
concerned about the possibility of Monday-morning quarterbacking 
while, at the same time, also experienced relatively little of it in 
practice. If so, it is then conceivable that many would discount the 













Very likely 0.0% 6.7% 0.0% 50.0% 58.1% 68.4%
Somewhat likely 15.4% 13.3% 16.7% 44.4% 32.3% 15.8%
Neutral 30.8% 46.7% 33.3% 0.0% 9.7% 15.8%
Somewhat unlikely 38.5% 33.3% 33.3% 5.6% 0.0% 0.0%
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while still harboring concerns. However, when officer experience 
changes and concern is elevated to reality (as may have been the case 
for SPD in Survey 4) it stands to reason that expectations of 
disciplinary action would rise accordingly. Finally, the discrepancy 
can be further explained due to the fact that there are many other 
ways of being held accountable: Monday-morning quarterbacking 
does not by definition lead to disciplinary action. Scrutiny takes many 
forms, and disciplinary action is only one of them. 
Another area in which officers’ exercise discretion concerns the 
use of force. Several officers worry that the implementation of BWCs 
alongside Monday-morning quarterbacking will lead officers to use 
less force than is required or justified, ultimately jeopardizing officer 
safety. One officer stated that the decision to use force has been 
replaced with the decision to estimate how others will perceive that use 
of force. Interestingly, although officer discretion is usually thought of 
as “letting someone off the hook” the reverse is sometimes true 
here—rather than “conforming” by using the appropriate amount of 
force in situations in which policy would allow it, officers reported 
feeling obligated to use their discretion to de-escalate the situation 
and essentially be more lenient. 
Even though many officers resist the idea of their cameras always 
being on and recording everything, they also frequently express 
concern over the act of having to turn on the camera. It stands to 
reason that this issue is amplified by the possibility of scrutiny if they 
fail to turn it on in a critical situation. And, as one officer mentioned, 
in addition to turning the camera on, officers also must “[advise] the 
person or persons of the recording” and “constantly evaluate if they 
can legally or within policy continue the recording.” Our data also 
shows that some officers feel that policy and law are unclear on this 
point, and this uncertainty and perceived ambiguity may ultimately 
affect their decision to use discretion to turn the cameras on or off.  
Another commonly recurring issue (closely related to the 
Monday-morning quarterbacking complaint) concerns the fact that 
officers believe that the public will mistakenly assume that anything 
caught on camera was perceived by the officer and vice versa. A few 
officers noted that this may lead to officers becoming more focused 
on positioning the camera so that it captures as much as possible, 
which may sometimes run in tension with their training to orient 
themselves in particular ways for the sake of safety. Finally, some 
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officers expressed concern that their word will no longer carry weight 
unless a video is present, and fear that, in the future, prosecutors will 
refuse to charge a case unless footage is present, or defense attorneys 
will be able to use the lack of footage to get charges dropped. 
C.  Self-Reported Activation Rates 
On the second and third surveys, smaller percentages of officers 
reported activating their cameras frequently during police-public 
encounters than reported that cameras should be activated in the 
same circumstances.84 This is an interesting finding, given that we 
assumed officers would generally not report activating their cameras 
less frequently than they felt they should be. However, on Survey 4, 
this trend reversed itself across most—but not all—of the contexts. 
These observations may suggest that officers may not be averse to 
somewhat stricter activation policies in these types of contexts. For 
example, closer to half of the respondents (51.1%, 51.6%, and 63.7%) 
reported that cameras should “always” be activated during arrest 
situations, while only 37.5%, 41.4%, and 61.4% reported always 
activating their own cameras in the same context. The self-corrective 
responses, if they are roughly true to officers’ actual experiences, 
would suggest that officers are increasingly activating their cameras as 














                                                 
 84. Compare the data in Table 7 with that in Table 6. 
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Context 
“Always” (%) “Always” or “Most of the 
Time” (%) 
S2 S3 S4 S2 S3 S4 
All public 
encounters 
 8.9   10.3 18.1* 51.8     47.1 61.4* 
Arrest situations 37.5   41.4 61.4 85.7     88.5 96.4* 
Traffic stops 46.4*  35.6 51.8 78.6     75.9 86.7* 
Inside homes 19.6*  14.9 28.9* 39.3     49.4 68.7* 
Domestic 
violence calls 32.1   31.0 54.2
* 73.2     79.3 91.6* 
Inside medical 
facilities - 4.6 6.0
*  -        18.4 31.3* 
Witness 
statements 
- 17.2 32.5*  -        59.8 69.9 
Victim statements -     16.1 30.1*   -       56.3 66.3* 
* Indicates higher percentage response than to the normative results in Table 6. 
Table 7. Percentage of Officers Who Reported That They 
Activated Their BWCs “Always” or “Most of the Time” 
During Each Context, by Survey. 
 
Officers reported activating their cameras “always” or “most of 
the time” during arrest situations, traffic stops, and domestic violence 
calls much more frequently than in the other five contexts. 
Respondents indicated much less frequent activation inside medical 
facilities (e.g., hospitals), with a full third (33.3%) indicating they 
never activated in such circumstances on Survey 3 (see Figure 8, 
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Figure 8. Self-Reported Responses to Questions Asking How 
Often They Typically Activated Their BWC in Each Given 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
If BWC activation policies are—as organizations such as the 
ACLU suggest—indeed to be given “teeth,”85 then we must also 
consider the possible consequences for officer behavior in terms of 
turning the cameras on or off. Substantially reprimanding officers or 
adopting evidentiary presumptions, should they fail to record, may 
lead to officers refusing to exercise discretion in favor of citizen 
privacy (to the extent they would choose to do so, if allowed). 
Although the privacy argument is often hailed as an argument in 
favor of officer discretion, it is often presented too simply.  
Privacy is a difficult concept to grasp and is implicated in a 
variety of ways in different contexts.86 The decision of whether 
privacy is sufficiently implicated to warrant turning the camera off in 
a particular scenario does not lend itself well to the quickly 
developing situations officers are often confronted with. It stands to 
reason that high-pressure and, consequently, high-stress 
circumstances will eventually cause officers to misjudge a situation, 
which will subsequently lead to reprimand or evidentiary 
presumptions in favor of a suspect. It does not seem likely that those 
same officers will risk turning the camera off for privacy 
considerations in the future. Instead, it seems much more likely that 
those officers will simply keep the camera running permanently.87 
The complexity of adopting strong disciplinary measures and 
evidentiary presumptions (which means that theoretically, criminals 
could go free through fault of an officer) and increasing the amount 
of complex on-the-spot decision-making is highlighted in the 
perspective, offered by a detective, that there are “so many rules 
[about when to activate or not activate] right now, I honestly could 
not recite them to you. Which means I am almost certainly breaking 
policy, yet with absolutely no intention to do so. Damned if I do, 
                                                 
 85. See STANLEY, supra note 24, at 4. 
 86. See Bert-Jaap Koops et al., A Typology of Privacy, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 483, 487 
(2017) (“Privacy is notoriously hard to capture.”); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of 
Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 485 (2006) (“Privacy is too complicated a concept to be 
boiled down to a single essence”). 
 87. Theoretically, it is also possible that criminals, aware of police policy, could 
attempt to trick officers into turning the cameras off—although this scenario does appear 
far-fetched. 
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damned if I don’t.” Because these normative measures run counter to 
the nature of officers’ primary job functions, it stands to reason that 
such policy would be met with significant resistance and negatively 
shape their perception of the technology.88 However, the 
technological automation of BWC activation may serve to quell some 
of these problems, especially as it would simultaneously remove most 
officer discretion from the equation and, likewise, limit the 
applicability of evidentiary presumptions against officers (unless the 
evidence showed the officer manually deactivated the camera). 
However, these improvements should also be met with some concern 
and caution, especially when activation happens frequently and public 
disclosure allows wide access to footage, as officers would then be 
more limited in their ability to exercise their discretion to not record 
sensitive interactions. Essentially, this would place the onus of 
protecting privacy or of not exposing confidential informants on state 
legislatures (regarding public disclosure law) and public records units 
within police agencies.  
Furthermore, policing is generally regarded as a line of work 
with a very high degree of occupational stress, and the accessibility of 
coping mechanisms is—amongst other things89—considered key in 
this regard. Venting or laughing with fellow officers could be 
considered a positive coping mechanism, as opposed to negative 
coping mechanisms which are predominantly self-destructive in 
nature, such as (increased) drug use or social isolation.90 Moreover, it 
is possible that inhibiting officers’ ability (or willingness) to speak 
their minds freely to each other would also diminish their ability to 
form meaningful connections with co-workers, thus restricting the 
role of peer support; another key factor in reducing stress.91 
                                                 
 88. See Lum et al., supra note 57, at 155. 
 89. For an excellent summary of the subject matter and overview of the literature, see 
generally He et al., supra note 82. 
 90. See id. at 691–92 (discussing examples of positive and negative “coping 
strategies”). 
 91. See id. at 690 (noting “a substantial body of literature addresses the important role 
of peer support and trust of co-workers and supervisors in buffering the effects of stress 
related to police work”); Harvey J. Burnett, Jr., A Study of the Relationship Between 
Police Stress and Moral Reasoning, Coping Mechanisms, and Selected Demographic 
Variables 22–23 (May 2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Andrews University), 
http://digitalcommons.andrews.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1253&context=dissertations 
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A key component of the frame through which officers interpret 
BWC technology concerns the perceived polarization between the 
police and the public. Throughout the interviews, respondents 
expressed or otherwise implied that there is a severe disconnect 
between how they perceive themselves (and the reality of their work) 
and how outsiders perceive them, and how these different viewpoints 
drive different interpretations of BWC use. This incongruence may 
explain why many officers interpret the technology as, essentially, 
something to be used against them. Moreover, officers often assume 
that the worth of an officer’s word—which, in their view, has already 
been significantly marginalized—will be diminished further through 
BWC adoption because courts and the public will only believe that 
something happened if it is caught on camera. Personal experience 
and training have taught officers that what the camera captures is not 
necessarily what the officer perceives (and vice versa). Not only in a 
literal sense, but also with regards to the various nuances that a 
particular incident or situation may involve. As one officer stated, 
“[t]he limitations of a body-worn camera need to be taught to 
[civilians] watching the video. The persons watching the video need to 
understand the science of force, the [anomalies] of the effects of 
adrenaline, and human behavior under stress.”  
The perceived overemphasis on accountability was a prominent 
theme, and officers often saw this focus on accountability as hindering 
their ability to accomplish their primary police functions. These 
findings are generally consistent with those of other authors, such as 
Chan.92 Similarly, our respondents express worry that BWCs 
compound already existing issues regarding (lack of) trust in officers 
by supervisors and the public. At the same time, although benefits to 
the technology are most often framed as a safeguard against false 
accusations, many officers perceive a wider range of benefits. For the 
most part, these perceived benefits fit the traditional and reactive 
approach to policing which still dominates law enforcement as 
described by Lum et al., in the sense that BWCs assist officers in 
carrying out their primary duties via improved evidence collection, 
                                                                                                                 
[https://perma.cc/AR26-RLLV] (discussing the relationship between officers’ support 
system and stress). 
 92. See Janet B.L. Chan, The Technological Game: How Information Technology is 
Transforming Police Practice, 1 CRIM. JUST. 139, 156 (2001). 
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easier report-writing, and the (alleged) mediating effect on citizen 
behavior.93 
However, several responses also suggest that some officers are 
developing a broader conception of the advantages that BWCs may 
bring: these officers express sincere concern that the public has lost 
trust in law enforcement and consider BWCs as a way to show the 
public the realities that they face and the good nature of their 
intentions. For example, some officers mentioned their hope that 
BWCs “will educate the public on what we see at the time of any 
encounter and see how little time we have to make a decision instead 
of assuming the worst.” Rather than experiencing camera footage as a 
possible safeguard against accusations—a highly reactive way of 
looking at things—these officers see the other side of the coin, which 
is much more proactive in nature. If organizational measures can be 
taken to further foster such perceptions (which may, for example, 
consist of convincing officers that effective policing in the modern era 
is highly reliant on community relations and demonstrating actual 
evidence which shows that BWCs can improve public trust in the 
police) then it stands to reason that some officers may be less 
resentful towards accountability demands.94 Educating the public on 
what cameras do—and perhaps more importantly, do not—could help 
to further realize this effect. 
In the end, activation policies need to be drafted in ways that 
provide officers with clear and practical guidance, incentivize 
activation in appropriate circumstances while allowing for some forms 
of discretion, particularly in situations that implicate the legitimate 
privacy-related concerns of bystanders, victims, witnesses, informants, 
and suspects. At least in states like Washington, with liberal public 
disclosure policies,95 questions of public access to footage also 
substantially affect the technological frames that officers form 
regarding the implications of their own BWC use. In the future, these 
                                                 
 93. See id. at 138, 155. 
 94. See id. at 155; see also Lum et al., supra note 57, at 157 (explaining that “from a 
policy and practice perspective, adjusting those frames (e.g., through training, technical 
support, and organizational incentives) becomes important to adjusting the outcomes that 
agency leaders or citizens want from technology”). 
 95. See Newell, supra note 4, at 1370–76 (discussing public disclosure law in 
Washington). 
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questions of public access to information and privacy should be 
addressed by state legislatures prior to wide BWC deployment, rather 
than only as an ex post reaction to otherwise predictable public 
requests for potentially sensitive footage. Properly balancing 
transparency interests and privacy interests in state freedom of 
information law is an important, and difficult, task—and it supports 
the practical obscurity96 of innocent civilians caught by cameras 
intended to watch the police. However, striking a reasonable balance 
might help incentivize more frequent activation in circumstances 
where the potential for wide public visibility may otherwise push 
against officers’ willingness to record due to privacy (or other, 
related) concerns. 
As noted above, supervisors generally report that cameras 
should be activated more frequently than front-line officers do. At 
least in terms of those in higher supervisory and administrative 
positions, it seems clear that these two sets of officers might hold 
different technological frames regarding the purposes, benefits, and 
use of BWCs. When the frames between these groups are 
incongruent, it “can result in conflicts about the development, use, 
and meaning of technologies in a police organization, as well as 
different outcomes of technology.”97 Questions about differences in 
supervisors’ and front-line officers’ perceptions of cameras, and the 
outcomes these differences drive, deserve greater focus in future 
research. Relatedly, concerns over ‘Monday-morning quarterbacking’ 
potentially pose significant barriers to camera activation. Because 
BWCs are generally seen and implemented as an accountability tool 
(at least in part), such Monday-morning quarterbacking is, to some 
extent, inevitable. At the same time, policy that provides officers with 
some protection against arbitrary scrutiny may prove to be valuable 
in incentivizing camera activation. 
 
                                                 
 96. See Woodrow Hartzog, Body Cameras and the Path to Redeem Privacy Law, 96 
N.C. L. REV. 1257, 1259–63 (2018). 
 97. Lum et al., supra note 57, at 138. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the officers we interviewed or surveyed within 
these two departments held varying initial technological frames 
regarding BWCs and the impact of BWCs on their discretion. 
Perceptions of BWCs ranged from the impression that the cameras 
were being used primarily (or solely) as a means to increase officer 
accountability to those that emphasized the positive role BWCs can 
play in the collection of evidence (including both for officers to use to 
counter claims of misconduct as well as to support investigations). 
Some officers also held the view that BWCs would provide a means 
to show the public what real police work looked like (often dull, 
routine, and boring or, at least, not filled with officers constantly 
using force against suspects). A minority of officers agreed that 
“always-on” activation policies were appropriate, generally due to 
their concerns that selective recording would inevitably be held 
against officers. In this sense, frequent activation was effectively seen 
as a mechanism to preemptively shield officers against unjustified 
criticism or unfounded claims of misconduct by supervisors, the 
media, and the public.  
In terms of activation, officers reported high rates of agreement 
that certain types of calls warrant activation in most cases, particularly 
during arrest situations, traffic stops, and domestic violence calls. 
However, officers were somewhat less in favor of frequent recording 
inside medical facilities or inside private homes. Over half of our 
respondents reported that cameras should be activated during most or 
all police-public interactions, and that BWCs were an appropriate 
means to document witness or victim statements. Interestingly, our 
respondents reported overall less frequent activation in practice 
across contexts than their normative judgments would indicate, 
perhaps indicating that they would not necessarily be averse to 
stronger activation polices. 
When considering the tensions between activation, 
accountability, transparency, and privacy, police agencies, and the 
legislatures that regulate them, should seek to carefully consider a 
balance between ex ante (policy) versus ex post (data management 
and freedom of information) strategies. More research is needed to 
examine how BWCs and activation policies affect officer and civilian 
privacy and the willingness of witnesses and victims to talk, including 
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in sensitive cases like domestic violence, sexual assault, death, inside 
homes and medical facilities, and when officers are dealing with 
confidential informants. Legislatures should be attuned to this 
research as it emerges, and account for it in the ways they regulate 
police use of BWCs and public access to BWC footage. Additionally, 
future research is needed to shed more light on how the technological 
frames that officers have of the cameras (and how these may change 
over time) and how organizational considerations shape technology 
use by officers, and how officers might choose to resist compliance or 
use the technology in unexpected ways. 
As the technological landscape surrounding BWCs continues to 
evolve, so will the debate about camera activation. As mentioned 
previously, technological triggers are slowly but surely finding their 
way into newer versions of BWCs. It is tempting to think that this 
would solve the issue of discretion altogether, as activation would 
consequently cease to be a matter of discretion for officers but rather 
for engineers and leadership who set the relevant activation 
thresholds. However, these developments should by no means be 
considered a panacea. At least for the foreseeable future, 
technological triggers cannot replace human judgment in the 
inherently complex situations officers are faced with on a day to day 
basis. For example, cameras may inadvertently activate due to a loud 
sound or the subsequent increased heartrate of an officer during a 
highly sensitive conversation with an informant. Some degree of 
camera control by officers will always need to be present. At the same 
time, technological triggers hold significant promise—provided they 
are implemented appropriately, taking full account of the context of 
technological frames. We recommend, for example, that rather than 
engineers or leadership setting the trigger thresholds, officers would 
be allowed to set and tweak the triggers themselves (within certain 
limits set by departmental policy). This helps reinforce the idea that 
BWCs are useful tools that help them do their jobs, rather than tools 
by which to exercise surveillance and scrutiny. Considering that many 
officers spoke negatively of the need to manually activate the camera 
and the resulting consequences for officer safety, it is likely they 
would welcome such developments—if indeed framed correctly. 
In a similar vein, developments in IT and computing are allowing 
for more effective and efficient data management. “Record-
everything” strategies, when accompanied by strict and effective data-
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management systems, would eliminate the issue of activation while 
simultaneously mitigating the resulting privacy harm. It remains, 
however, a matter of trust between state and citizen and the 
perception of the latter towards the former. Even when data 
management policy is backed by legislation (through, for example, 
strict limits on retention periods), it stands to reason that many 
citizens would nevertheless object to being recorded on video. This is 
particularly so for (possible) informants for whom anonymity is 
especially key. 
As it stands, activation policies need to be drafted to provide 
officers clear and practical guidance, incentivize activation in 
appropriate circumstances while allowing for some forms of 
discretion, particularly in situations that implicate the legitimate 
privacy-related concerns of bystanders, victims, witnesses, informants, 
and suspects. Importantly, questions of public access to footage need 
to be addressed to properly incentivize recording in some 
circumstances where the potential for wide public visibility may push 
against officers’ willingness to record due to privacy (or other) 
concerns. Additionally, officers’ BWC activation (and attitudes 
toward activation) should not only be seen as a consequence of their 
fear of being held accountable for misconduct (e.g., due to the 
“deterrence spectrum”98)—rather, because the officers we studied 
were also concerned with what and how their video would capture 
useful evidence and portray their work to others, we should also focus 
on how their “use of the technology . . . [might be] best understood as 
consistent with the impressions [they] wish to convey to particular 
audiences.”99 In this regard, individual officers have become part of, 
and may have begun to internalize, the broader information politics 
of the police to a greater extent due to the deployment of BWCs 
within their agencies. BWCs have forced officers to constantly 
balance and reconcile their (sometimes competing) interests in 
impression management, documenting and collecting evidence, and 
avoiding accountability for mistakes or malfeasance. To this end, it 
                                                 
 98. See Ariel et al., supra note 21, at 14 (explaining that “[t]he deterrence spectrum 
encapsulates the entire range of deterrence effects that an intervention .	.	. can have on 
[certain behavior]”). 
 99. Manning, supra note 16, at 52. 
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remains important to understand the technological and organizational 
frames that officers have of BWCs and other related technologies, 
including “the assumptions, expectations and knowledge”100 of the 
police, and additional research is needed, in a variety of settings and 
contexts, so we can gain a broader and more generalizable 
understanding of how BWCs are impacting the nature of police work 
and the use of these and related surveillance technologies within 
police departments. In the end, questions about appropriate 
activation policies and practices are all about power, accountability, 
and information politics. They cannot always be easily separated from 
related questions about information access and control, meaning that 
the appropriateness of any particular activation policy may depend in 
large part on the local social, political, and legal context in which the 





















                                                 
 100. Orlikowski & Gash, supra note 9, at 178. 
